The
following list of titles and accompanying dates refers to past
postings on the blog, Gravitas: A Voice for Civics Education, that
have been deleted. After each title and date, the entries below
include the first paragraph of each respective posting. If you
care to receive a copy of a particular posting, send your request via
email to gravitascivics@gmail.com . One posting per request.
161
CONSIDERED IDEALS
(March
23, 2012)
In
trying to present my preferred construct, the mental overarching
theory I believe should guide our study of civics, I have in the last
few postings shared my assumptions regarding decision-making. Why
decision-making? I have done this because I am committed to the idea
that good citizenship is an active citizenship. This is in line with
my preferred construct – federation theory. One needs to decide to
act before one does act and this simple observation predicates the
conclusion that decision-making is a central process in this whole
topic of citizenship and a topic that federation theory should
address. While my aim is not to provide a comprehensive theory of
decision-making, I do feel the necessity to share with you what I
believe are the governing ideas or variables of the process – ideas
or variables which are necessary to understand in order to make sense
of this crucial aspect.
162
REPORTED IDEALS AMONG AMERICANS
(March
26, 2012)
What
happens when a nation adopts a natural rights sense of what should be
the ideal? For those who do not know the term, natural rights refers
to a mental construct in which individuals are valued as sovereign
agents with the rights to determine life defining values and goals
and consequent actions. Look around, for this nation adopted natural
rights as the prevalent construct regarding governance and politics
about sixty years ago. This transition to natural rights did not
happen overnight. The transition began as soon as the ink on the
Declaration of Independence was drying. In the period between
the Declaration and the writing of the Constitution, a
radical version of federalism was prevalent as the political
orientation or construct which was employed to formulate public
policy. It led to abuses of individual rights – particularly the
rights of individuals of the property class in the several states.
Our constitution, written in 1787, was a significant step away from
radical federalism. But despite that move, I would argue that the
main view of politics remained the federalist construct. But the
march toward individualism and a natural rights view had a healthy
beginning in the late eighteenth century which culminated at the end
of World War II. The 1950s marks the first decade in which this
nation adopted natural rights as its prominent view.
163
TRANSITION TOWARD VIEWING POLITICAL CONTENT
(March
30, 2012)
I
have introduced the construct, federation theory, as my favored
approach and guide to the study of civics. So far, I have reviewed
this view's position on morality. You are encouraged to click on the
appropriate past postings which began appearing in this blog on
October 11, 2011. This series of postings followed another series of
postings that reviewed the history of federalism, especially its
early history stretching all the way back to our colonial past –
federalism has a long respectful history in American society.
164
COVENANTS OR COMPACTS
(April
2, 2012)
With
this posting, I will begin answering the question: according to
federation theory, what is the nature of governance and politics? To
answer this question, I will begin by reviewing the meaning of
essential concepts which provide a foundation for the construct. The
first concepts are covenant and compact. I should write covenant or
compact since both terms mean the same thing except for a very
important distinction. This element of the construct retains its
meaning which I described in an earlier posting when I was explaining
traditional federalism. So, as a reminder:
Covenantal
foundings emphasize the deliberate coming together of humans as
equals to establish politics in such a way that all reaffirm their
fundamental equality and retain their basic rights … Polities
whose origins are covenantal reflect the exercise of constitutional
choice and broad-based participation in constitutional design.
Polities founded by covenant are essentially federal in character, in
the original meaning of the term (from foedus, Latin for covenant).
[Elazar,
D. J. (1991). Federal models of (civil) authority. Journal
of Church and State,
33
(Spring), pp. 231-254. Citation pp. 233-234.]
As
I will use these ideas and, due to the current social and political
environment which is encouraged by the prevalent natural rights
perspective, certain attributes need to be emphasized.
Unfortunately, the term covenant, as it is currently used, has become
synonymous with the word, contract. But within federation theory,
there is a significant difference between the idea of contract and
that of covenant or compact. Contracts are agreements between
persons over limited issues or binding clauses. Covenants or
compacts refer to obligations that
… ought
to be seen as more comprehensive and more binding. … [It] suggests
an indefeasible commitment and a continuing relationship. The bond
is relatively unconditional, relatively indissoluble …
Covenant
is more ambiguous [than contract]. … The ensuing obligations are
not fully specified in advance; instead, they derive from the nature
and history of the relationship. Respect for parents, nurture of
children, civic virtue: these duties and ideals are neither founded
in consent nor created through negotiation [as in the case of a
contract]. [Selznick, P.
(1992). The moral
commonwealth: Social theory and the promise of community.
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Citation pp.
479-480.]
165
FEDERALIST EQUALITY
(April
6, 2012)
What
is the nature of governance and politics? In the last posting, I
began to provide an answer to this question from the perspective of
federation theory. In that posting, I reviewed the first elements of
federalism, those of covenants or compacts. Covenants or compacts
are central to the idea of federalism. In whatever form that idea is
held or presented, there is this foundational, structural element of
people coming together, formulating a union under a “sacred”
agreement – either in the form of a covenant or compact. By so
couching governance and politics, one ascribes to these categories of
human activity a communal perspective.
166
BASELINE EQUALITY
(April
9, 2012)
One
of the objectives of this blog is to present, explain, and promote a
mental construct of governance and politics. That construct I have
entitled federation theory. In order to explain this construct, I am
presenting its different elements. To date, I have reviewed the
elements of covenant or compact and have started, in the last
posting, to explain the element of equality. Equality fulfills a
central function within the overall conceptional structure of
federation theory. “Moral equality is the postulate that all
persons have the same intrinsic worth.” [Selznick,
P. (1992). The moral
commonwealth: Social theory and the promise of community.
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Citation found on p.
483.] Phillip Selznick describes this element from two
levels: baseline equality and equal treatment. In the last posting,
I indicated that within this construct, equality is seen as a means
by which a community can be formulated using a federal organizational
form. This posting will make the case that equality provides a “path
to community” in which the members of a formulated union are held
to be equal in certain important aspects: moral decision-making,
dignity, participation, and consent.
167
EQUAL TREATMENT
(April
13, 2012)
This
blog is in the midst of describing and explaining the elements of a
mental construct suitable for guiding civics instruction in American
secondary schools. I have given the name, federation theory, to this
construct. The elements so far reviewed are covenant or compact and
baseline equality. You are invited to click on the last two postings
to view those descriptions. The next element I want to describe is
equal treatment.
168
AN EQUALITY AIM
(April
16, 2012)
I
have in the last two postings reviewed how federation theory
conceptually treats equality. I broke it down into two types:
baseline equality and equal treatment. While I described these
elements as ideals, perhaps one might attach a legalistic attribute
to these ideas that was not intended. In this posting, I want to
clarify any misconception on that score.
169
IDEAL BALANCE BETWEEN MAJORITY AND MINORITY
(April
20, 2012)
In
my attempt to describe and explain the federation theory, I have to
date reviewed the elements of the construct I have identified:
covenant or compact and equality. The next element I want to review
is communal democracy. This element includes the idea of the
“consent of the governed” and how it is associated with the rule
of the governed. What federation theory stresses is that the rule
and consent must be viewed as that emanating from a functioning
community instead of from an aggregate of individuals – the
individualistic perspective is more akin to the natural rights
perspective prevalent today. This shift to a communal democracy
entails four principles: “the protection and integration of
minorities; the moral primacy of the community over the state; the
responsibility of government for communal well-being; and the social
basis of political participation.” [Selznick,
P. (1992). The moral
commonwealth: Social theory and the promise of community.
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Citation found on p.
503.] This posting will focus on the first of these
principles, the protection and integration of minorities.
170
FIRST THE COMMUNITY
(April
23, 2012)
Being
in the midst of describing and explaining an element of the
federation theory construct, communal democracy, I have reviewed the
first principle of this element, the protection and integration of
minorities. This posting will focus on the second principle, the
moral primacy of the community over the state. Here there is a bit
of mis-instruction in our schools. Despite the fact that many
descriptions of the social contract concept are often erroneously
presented in secondary textbooks – as being solely the product of
Thomas Hobbes' view [See for
example McClenaghan, W. A. (1999). Magruder’s
American government.
Needham, MA: Prentice Hall. These texts present Hobbes' view
as that of Locke.] which states that individuals enter the
contract by giving up only those rights necessary for mutual defense
– according to John Locke's theory, the state (the government)
originates from a preexisting community, not from autonomous and
endangered individuals. [McClelland,
J. S. (1996). A
history of western political thought.
New York: Routledge.] “What ever may be said of other
aspects of his thought, this Lockean premise [the protection
of fundamental rights of life, liberty, and property] does not entail
a radical individualism.” [Selznick,
P. (1992). The moral
commonwealth: Social theory and the promise of community.
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Citation on p. 507.]
In writing about this issue, Phillip Selznick insists, Lockean view
is based on a perception of a person entangled in a social context
with relations of family, friends, and commitments. The creation of
a law generating a regime or government helps to perfect the
community; it does not create it. The community already has the
foundation to be moral through its kinship and resulting traditions
that bolster its cohesion. Morality is allowed to transcend the
public and the private spheres of the community. It also provides
the way for the community to be “civilized.”
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